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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the role of culture in Korea’s economic development, with an eye 
to future prospects. Economic development is a complex phenomenon influenced by 
capital, labour, technology, and formal and informal institutions. Culture has 
important bearings on the economy not only through its direct effects on the 
behaviours of individual economic actors but also through its effects on the 
performance of formal institutions. Culture underpins formal institutions and is the 
underlying prerequisite for successful institutional performance. Post-crisis reforms of 
the Korean economy involved embedding new institutional arrangements, which are 
consistent with the advanced Western systems. Yet the required cultural underlay has 
not yet developed, leading to a limited success of the reforms (Kwon 2010a).  
Therefore, recognising the complementarity of the multiple factors for economic 
development, this paper explores the role of culture as one of the important 
development factors to better understand the nature of economic development in 
Korea and how recent cultural changes augur for future prospects of the national 
economy.  
2. Literature review 
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Conventional economists have traditionally shied away from analysing culture in 
economic development because of its complexity, the difficulties in quantification, 
and the ambiguity of causality in the relationship between culture and economic 
development. Neoclassical economics simply assumes away culture as a matter of 
ceteris paribus. It was Max Weber (1950) who has considered at first different 
cultural influences on economic development. Weber argued that the Protestant work 
ethic was the basis of Western economic development and modernisation, and that the 
absence of this ethic in Asia was the reason for the region’s lower level of economic 
development. Harrison (1985), drawing from his extensive study of economic 
development in South American countries over two decades, argues that differences 
in economic development among countries or ethnic groups arise primarily due to 
cultural differences.  
 Swift and unprecedented economic success in East Asia, including Korea, has 
inclined scholars to take a cultural approach to East Asian economic development, 
recognising that economically successful East Asian countries share Confucianism as 
a common cultural influence. A number of scholars (Tu 1988, Tai 1989, Pye 1990, 
Levy 1992, Throsby 2001, Adams et al 2007, Allen et al 2007, Power et al 2009, to 
name a few) argue that Confucian culture is the key to East Asian economic success. 
They point to specific characteristics of Confucian culture, particularly hierarchical 
collectivism, loyalty toward authority, emphasis on education, and secularism which 
in turn emphases diligence, frugality and discipline. However, the Confucian model 
has a number of serious theoretical and methodological problems. It does not take into 
account cultural differences between national contexts. It simply assumes a causality 
from culture to economic development without demonstrating it empirically. The 
Confucian model lacks a firm empirical basis since it relates culture, which is by 
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nature a micro-psychological phenomenon and changes relatively slowly, to the ever-
changing macro processes of economic development. To investigate the role of 
culture in Korean economic development, we must therefore adjust the Confucian 
model so that it is conceptually useful for dealing with Korea as a special case.  
A number of Korean scholars (L.J. Cho 1994; S.S. Park 1995; Y.H. Kim 1994; 
Song 2003; K.C. Lee 1995; Koo 1995; Nam 1994) argued particularly during the 
1980s and 1990s that national culture contributed significantly to economic 
development over the three decades from the early 1960s. Korean society has a 
relatively homogeneous culture with its traits which are similar to Confucian cultural 
values.  Nam (1994), who served as one of the major architects and managers of 
Korean economic development during the 1960s and 1970s in the positions of 
Finance Minister, Deputy Prime Minister (in charge of the Economic Planning Board), 
and Prime Minister, has identified six principal factors that accounted for Korea’s 
rapid economic development, and four of them are related to culture. As L.J Cho 
(1994), S.S. Park (1995), Dodgson 2009; Oh and Kim (2002); and Yang and Lim 
(2007) argue, it should be pointed out, however, that the Korean Confucian tradition 
has some cultural traits detrimental to economic development, including a distinctive 
form of social stratification, denigration of manual labour, merchants and 
businessmen, a weak spirit of personal initiative and fatalism.   
 Serious reservations and qualifications have been put forward against the 
positive contribution of Confucianism to Korean economic development. If one 
accepts that Confucianism has made positive contributions to Korean economic 
development during the 1960s to the 1990s, important questions beg answers. The 
three with most significance, which has drawn little attention in the literature, are (1) 
why did cultural elements with positive influence for post-war economic development 
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fail to produce the same result much earlier in Korea’s long history? (2) Why did the 
Korean economy succumb so quickly to the 1997 financial crisis, given that 
fundamental cultural values had not changed abruptly? (3) What effects will culture 
have on the future prospects of the Korean economy?  
With regard to the first question, S.S. Park (1995) argues that although culture 
serves as a trigger for economic development, for the flame of Confucian culture to 
ignite economic development, certain political and economic preconditions must be 
met, including a free enterprise system, a competitive environment, international trade, 
appropriate institutions, and a stable and growing middle class.
1
 However, Park  does 
not adequately justify the need for the institutional prerequisites to enable  culture to 
trigger economic development. L.J. Cho (1994) argues that an inappropriate focus on 
cultural and social development has fostered undesirable Confucian values, as 
mentioned above, and contends that these negative Confucian values lose their 
strengths as the economy develops and a middle class emerges. He leaves 
unaddressed the role of culture at the initial stage of economic development until the 
middle class emerges. The arguments by both S.S. Park (1995) and L.J.Cho (1994) 
are not convincing and are almost impossible to test empirically, as is the Confucian 
model of East Asian economic development. 
 The second question of the role of culture uses the financial crisis to challenge 
the validity of cultural factors for explaining economic development in East Asia. Pye 
(2000) and Perkins (2000) argue that culture works within context, and since the 
context changed from the early 1990s, the system that worked well with traditional 
cultural traits could no longer work well under the changed conditions. For instance,  
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 Institutional prerequisites for favourable cultural traits to work for the Confucian model of East Asian 
economic development are also pointed out by Levy (1992) and Kunio (2006).    
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economic and business systems based on personal relationships could not survive 
under the liberalisation of capital markets. Similarly, Lee and McNulty (2003) argue 
that the inflexibility of the labour market, including no layoffs, lifetime employment 
and the seniority system that reflected collectivist Confucian values, could not work 
well under the emerging globalisation and liberalisation era since the early 1990s.  
 These arguments not only lack empirical basis, but they also raise another 
troublesome question. If the pre-crisis system established under the traditional culture 
did not work under the new context, would the new post-crisis system shaped by the 
post-crisis economic reforms work under the existing cultural background? This leads 
to the third question:  how will Korean culture work to shape future economic 
prospects? Existing models cannot properly address this question because they are 
methodologically unsound to relate directly culture to economic development. 
Therefore, to make a cultural model more operational and able to identify an easily 
conceivable causality, an operational intermediary should be introduced between 
culture and economic development. This is the concept of transaction cost.  
 Transaction costs, which have been assumed away by neoclassical economics,   
arise through the processes of negotiation between economic agents, valuation of 
goods and services to be exchanged, and enforcement of contracts (North 1990).
2
 Not 
only do transaction costs affect the economy directly as part of economic costs, but 
they also work as an important determinant of how well markets function. Well-
functioning markets lead to a high degree of specialisation and division of labour in 
an economy, which in turn leads to a higher level of productivity and economic 
progress. Therefore, appropriate institutions (both formal and informal) that would 
minimise transaction cost are required for economic development.  
                                                 
2
 North (1993) cites an empirical study which has found that 45 percent of US GNP was devoted to the 
transaction sector in 1970. In addition, there are a number of empirical estimates of transaction costs. 
For this, see Wang (2003).  
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 Harrison (1985) argues that culture shapes the radius of trust and identification 
that people experience and the rigour of a society’s system of ethics, which are 
equivalent to ‘social capital’ (Fukuyama 1995) and affect the level of transaction costs. 
A broader radius of trust and identification lowers transaction costs because in such a 
fiduciary relationship people generally believe that others will play by the rules. 
Strong inclination to follow laws and rules reduces enforcement costs of contracts. A 
broader radius of trust and identification and a higher ethics level improve 
cooperation and compromise among members of society, which are part of social 
capital. Harrison also argues that the rigour of the ethical system determines the sense 
of social justice or fairness which in turn increases social capital.
3
  
 Harrison (1985) contends that in dynamics the creative capacity of all citizens 
is the main source of economic development. Culture affects economic development 
through its impact on the creative capacity of all citizens. Harrison identifies cultural 
traits that foster creative capacity as ‘future orientation, rationality and 
equality/authority’. The time orientation of a society is also highly important for 
economic development. If people’s major focus is on the future, and the idea of 
progress is well established in their culture, the notion that planning, savings and 
investment will be rewarded by improved living conditions will dominate. Future 
orientation also implies the possibility of change, including introduction of new 
technology and the well-known concept of ‘creative destruction’ of Schumpeter 
(1951). People with future orientation are more likely to undertake education and 
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 There are a number of  studies on effects of social capital (or trust) on transaction costs (Putman 
1995; Moore and de Bruin 2004; Dyer and Chu 2002).  Lee and Jeong (2009) estimate the levels of  
social capital of  72 countries in 2008,  the components of which include: social trust, observance of 
social rules, social network, society’s unfairness and conflicts.  
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work hard at the expense of present enjoyment of leisure.
4
 It is readily conceivable 
that rationality and equality contribute to a nation’s creative capacity. Rationality 
encourages the pursuit of scientific discovery. People’s orientation toward equality is 
more conducive to economic development than an orientation toward hierarchy and 
authoritarianism, as equality encourages free competition, mobility and pursuit of 
knowledge. This new approach with the concepts of transaction cost as an intervening 
variable between culture and economic development and creative capacity is 
employed below in addressing the three questions identified above regarding the role 
of culture in the Korean economy.  
3. New Assessment of Cultural Effects on the Korean Economy  
3.1 Why Culture Did Not Produce Economic Growth Historically 
Over the 500 years of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910), Korea adopted the Confucian 
canon as the national religion or social ethical principles, and its culture, society and 
governance systems became profoundly imbued with Confucianism.
5
 Under the 
prevailing culture over the Yi dynasty, transaction costs were high and the creative 
capacity of the Korean people was minimal. Society did not establish the basic formal 
institutions required for a market system, such as laws to protect private property 
rights. In terms of culture, the radius of trust was limited because of collectivism 
centred on the extended family, and the ethical system was loose as attested by the 
prevalence of corruption and political confrontation. The people’s creative capacity 
could not develop under the dynastic rules. People remained unaware of scientific and 
economic progress around the world as the dynasty applied a strict isolation policy. 
People were highly influenced by Shamanism and fatalism that forestalled rational 
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 Vecchi and Brennan(2009) argue that a nation’s culture is associated with its innovation capacity, and 
their findings suggest that  individualistic, low power distance and uncertainty avoidance cultures will 
display better innovation performance. 
5
 For detailed examinations of historical developments of Confucianism, culture, society, politics and 
economy in Korea, see Han (1969) and Grayson (2002).    
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thinking. Together with strong authoritarianism and collectivism, a distinctive form of 
social stratification prevailed in society, and manual labour, merchants and business 
people were widely denigrated. These circumstances crippled the spirit of 
entrepreneurship, independence, equality and creative capacity of people. 
 Korea’s economic situation improved little under the oppressive Japanese 
colonial regime from 1910 to 1945. The few established institutions were re-geared to 
benefit the colonial master. Harsh regulation forced obedience to laws, and the radius 
of trust narrowed even further. These conditions demolished not only the hopes of the 
Korean people but also their creative capacity and future aspirations. The education 
system did not introduce scientific and rational thinking to the general public. With 
liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, Korea went through a chaotic period. 
No sooner had Korea become a sovereign independent country, than the nation was 
divided into two. The 1950-53 Korea War utterly demolished not only the existing 
industrial base but also the social fabric. Survival as individuals or as family units 
prevailed as the utmost goal in society for a long while.  
3.2 Why Economic Development Began from the 1960s 
From the 1960s, the Korean economy was set to develop rapidly. The military regime 
of General Park Chung Hee that took government in 1961 introduced a strict 
authoritarian order, thereby reducing transaction costs. The Park regime created a 
number of formal institutions to strengthen the market system including protection of 
private property rights, and implemented a nationwide development campaign that 
cultivated future orientation. Park’s government introduced the first five-year 
economic plan in 1962 and consecutive five-year plans were devised and 
implemented until the beginning of the 1990s. These development plans led the 
Korean people to look towards the future, which inspired higher national savings and 
 9 
investment rates, the will to work harder, and a high pursuit of education.  Rapid 
industrialisation and rising employment opportunities in urban areas weakened social 
stratification and the long-held disdain for manual labour and commercial activities, 
thereby creating conditions that promoted aspirations to social equality.  
3.3 Why, then, the 1997 Financial Crisis? 
Park Chung Hee’s was just the first of a series of authoritarian regimes that tightly 
controlled and intervened extensively in the economy across the following three 
decades until the early 1990s. While the system had produced spectacular economic 
growth it had also bred institutional dysfunction. Private property rights, particularly 
of chaebols, were poorly protected under some of the military regimes. The state had 
confiscated assets of some of the chaebols in the early days of the Park regime and the 
Chun Doo Hwan regime (1981–1988).  The authoritarian regimes held the banking 
sector under tight control, enabling the government to control credit lines to private 
companies. Private companies were forced to collaborate with government to protect  
their private property and secure credit lines from banks, leading to corruption and 
cronyism. Generally, the more corrupt the society, the narrower the radius of trust and 
identification within it, which raises transaction costs for society.  
Extensive state intervention in the banking and business sectors and 
government protection thereof fostered the deluding perception that banks and 
chaebols were economically invincible. This perception engendered moral hazard for 
banks and chaebols, which encouraged them to underestimate transaction costs as 
well as business risk and expand their enterprises with debt capital. Cronyism may 
reduce transaction costs in a situation of a small number of actors involved as under 
the earlier stage of economic development in Korea. However, cronyism could not be 
sustained when the number of competitors reached a certain threshold and 
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competition became more intense with increasing liberalisation and globalisation 
from the beginning of the 1990s. Together with reduced state protection as part of 
economic liberalisation, the extant post-war business system based on moral hazard 
and underestimated transaction costs could not survive.  
 Another factor inspired by market liberalisation was the need for more 
domestically generated creative thinking. The creative capacity of Korean people had 
not been so critical for Korean economic development in so far as the country was 
catching up with advanced countries. Korean enterprises were able to purchase 
technology from further advanced countries. However, as Korea became a serious 
contender in many areas of international business, the Korean economy could not 
survive with technologies imported from competitor nations. International market 
competition has forced Korea to develop its own technology and to enhance its 
international competitiveness more than ever. This shift was reflected in low 
productivity growth and low international competitiveness from the early 1990s 
(Kwon 2010a). To maintain its rapid economic development, Korea needs a new level 
of the nation’s creative capacity and its requisite cultural values of future orientation, 
rational thinking and equality. These required cultural values could not develop 
quickly enough due to cultural inertia.  
4. Cultural Trends and the Future Korean Economy 
4.1 Recent Cultural Changes in Korean Society and Its Economic Prospects 
In the current liberalised and globalised economic environment, minimising 
transaction costs and maximising creative capacity of the Korean people are critically 
important for Korea to hold its economic performance relative to other nations. While 
cultural change is usually slow, the government’s reform program in response to the 
1997 crisis introduced a raft of institutional and legal reforms that have induced 
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relatively swift cultural change in Korea. The resulting changes in cultural values 
have become sources of decline in trust or increases in social discontent. In 1998 the 
labour law was changed to allow managers to lay-off workers for management 
reasons. This opened the way for private companies to dismiss a large number of staff 
as part of business restructuring, diminishing the concept of lifetime employment. 
Companies have also introduced performance-based compensation and promotion to 
replace the seniority system. These changes in human resource management create 
uncertainty for workers and inevitably reduce the level of trust between employers 
and employees. This reduction of trust in employment relations lowers loyalty toward 
companies and aggravates labour relations. All this, reflected in high labour disputes 
and Korea’s poor ranking internationally with labour relations (Tables 1 and 2), have 
raised transaction costs.   
Second, trust has declined from the rising disparity between regular and non-
regular workers. Since the 1997 crisis, many employers have changed employment 
from regular to non-regular workers to reduce production costs and to improve 
employment flexibility. As shown in Table 1, the proportion of non-regular workers 
increased from 27.4 percent in 2002 to 34.9 percent in 2009. Non-regular workers are 
treated substantially worse than regular workers in terms of remuneration and social 
and statutory benefits. The proportion of non-regular workers’ monthly income to 
regular workers’ income decreased from 67.1 percent in 2002 to 54.6 percent in 2009 
(KLI 2010). There are four social safety net programmes (employment insurance, 
industrial accident compensation insurance, national health insurance and national 
pension) for which both employees and employers have to contribute. Many non-
regular workers are not covered by these social programs (KLI 2010), nor are they 
eligible for statutory benefits by their companies such as overtime pay, paid annual 
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leave and maternity leave. In response to perceived injustice toward employees, the 
appeal of such approaches as cooperation, compromise, stability, and continuity has 
declined in Korean society, while confrontational attitudes have strengthened.  
Third, as Harrison (1985) and Josten (2004) argue, increasing inequality in 
income distribution reduces social capital and thereby increasing transaction costs. 
Inequality in income distribution has been rising. As shown in Table 1, income 
distribution measured by the Gini coefficient has somewhat worsened in the recent 
past. The ratio of income of the richest 10 percent of urban employees to that of the 
poorest 10 percent (Q10/Q1) increased from 7.48 in 2000 to 8.29 in 2009. Perceptions 
of injustice in society are also on the rise due not only to rising inequality in income 
but also in wealth distribution. J.W. Lee (2003) points out that disparity in the 
distribution of wealth is much worse than the inequality of income distribution, 
because of the heavy concentration of land ownership and the high price of land.   
Fourth, it appears that the rising income polarisation has been utilised for 
political purposes and as a result the political culture has developed in such a way that 
suspicion of, and hostility toward, political opponents continues to escalate. 
Consequently, political confrontation has become the rule of the game, while the 
concepts of cooperation and compromise have disappeared. One may expect the 
prevailing wrangling within the political sphere to adversely affect prospects for 
cooperation and compromise and hence the radius of trust within Korean society at 
large.  
Fifth, the social participation rate in community activities, which could 
enhance social capital, is extremely low. In 1999, only 23.1 percent of individuals had 
affiliation with social organisations. The majority of those participants are members 
of social meetings, religious organisations, and hobby, sports and leisure 
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organisations; only 13.6 percent of them are participating in civil society 
organisations, community interest groups and political groups. This shows that 
Korea’s group society is based on family, education, regions and religions. The social 
participation rate improved to 38.8 percent in 2006, yet only 15.3 percent of those 
participants are involved in civil society, community interest groups and political 
groups (KOSTAT 2011).   
Sixth, Fukuyama (1995) has argued that the rise of crime and litigation 
indicates the decline of social trust. In Korea today, the rule of law appears to be 
losing its regulatory power, as does the prerequisite underlay of trust and ethics that 
enables, sustains and reinforces rule of law. As shown in Table 1, the number of penal 
code criminal cases increased from 523000 in 2000 to 993000 in 2009, or a 7.4 
percent annual increment over the period. In the recent past, large-scale political 
corruption cases have been exposed, and illegal activities by corporations, unions and 
interest groups have been prevalent, vitiating the ethical system and its regulatory 
capacity over Korean society.
6
  
Finally, nationalism is still high in Korea, although like other emotional 
responses such as trust, it too is weakening. Relatively strong nationalism by 
comparison with other national examples helps to explain why many observers from 
overseas still regard Korean people as xenophobic (Dong-A Daily 2008, Dodgson 
2009). Indeed, the xenophobic attitude of many Koreans in general reduces the radius 
of identification and raises transaction costs in international commercial dealings, 
while globalisation transforms national economies worldwide.  
 The future orientation that fosters creative capacity within society also appears 
to be declining in recent years. Uncertainty perceived by workers after 1997, and 
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 Cha (2007) estimates that if the level of law observance in Korea over the last 10 years were the 
OECE average level, Korea’s annual economic growth rate could have been at least one percent point 
higher.  
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uncertainty and instability generated by inconsistent government policy measures in 
the recent past have also hindered the future orientation of citizens (Kwon 2010b).  
As imbedded in hierarchical collectivism with social stratification based on education 
and ranks in organisation, Korean society is lacking equality, as compared to 
advanced countries. In this respect, Oh and Kim (2002) and Yang and Lim (2007) and 
Dodgson (2009) argue that hierarchical collectivism in Korea would impede 
productivity, innovation and entrepreneurship.
7
 Declining savings and investment 
rates may reflect decline in future orientation. As shown in Table 1, the savings rate 
decreased from 33.0 percent in 2000 to 30.0 percent in 2009, while the investment 
rate from 30.7 percent to 25.8 percent during the same period. These decreases in 
savings and investment rates will adversely affect economic growth potential.  
Table 1 Korea’s Social and Economic Indicators 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
GDP growth (%) 8.8 4.0 7.2 2.8 4.6 4.0 5.2 5.1 2.0 0.2 
Saving rate (%) 33.0 31.1 30.5 31.9 34.0 32.1 30.8 30.8 30.5 30.0 
Investment rate 
(%) 
30.7 29.3 29.3 30.0 29.9 29.8 29.7 29.5 31.0 25.8 
Labor disputes 250 235 322 320 462 287 138 115 108 121 
% of non-regular 
workers  
n.a n.a. 27.4 32.6 37.0 36.6 35.5 35.9 33.8 34.9 
Gini coefficient 0.296 0.303 0.298 0.298 0.301 0301 0.299 0.304 0.303 0.301 
Q10/Q1(urban 
emplyees 
7.48 7.63 7.24 8.24 8.48 8.37 8.01 8.20 8.15 8.29 
Penal code 
criminal 
cases(000) 
523 554 797 857 827 826 828 845 898 993 
Sources: KOSTAT (2010), KLI (2010), KOSTAT (2011),  KIHASA (2011).   
 
4.2 Comparative Analysis of Recent Cultural Trends in Korea  
 
So far the wide-ranging cultural changes within Korean society have been analysed in 
terms of their possible effects on the future economy through their influences on 
future transaction costs and the nation’s creative capacity. This analysis should be 
                                                 
7
 Allick and Realo (2004) find out of their empirical studies of 37 countries that those societies 
characterized by the highest levels of individualism had the highest levels of interpersonal trust.  
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augmented, particularly to comprehend Korean cultural effects on its international 
competitiveness, by an analysis of a variety of Korean cultural facets relevant to  
economic development, compared to those advanced countries against which Korea 
has to compete. To this end, recent trends of relevant cultural facets within Korea are 
examined by comparing pertinent social indicators, which would reflect those cultural 
facets, to those of other countries. Table 2 shows Korea’s global rankings across 
various social indicators between 2000 and 2010 developed by a number of well-
known international organisations including the International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD), the World Economic Forum (WEF), Transparency 
International (TI). 
 Obviously trust has declined in the Korean labour market markedly more than 
other countries. According to the IMD and WEF, Korea’s labour relations were 
consistently among the worst over time (Table 2). Over the period 2000-2010, both 
the IMD and WEF show that Korea belonged to the worst 95 percentile. As a result, 
Korea was one of the countries that had most industrial disputes, as indicated by 
Korea’s rank of 39.9th on average out of 52 countries surveyed over the 2000-2008  
period.  
 Korean society’s view of individual firms’ behaviours is quite low, indicating 
a relatively low level of trust in companies, compared to advanced countries. 
According to the IMD, Korea’s rankings for the social responsibility of business 
leaders held fairly steady between 2000 and 2007, with a striking improvement in 
2008 and being worsened in the following two years, thereby bringing up an average 
ranking of 26.8
th
 out of 53 countries over the period 2000-2010. Over the same period, 
corporate ethical practices demonstrated a similar pattern, remaining at one of the 
worst until 2007 and improving somewhat thereafter, ranking on average 34.4
th
. For 
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ethical behaviours of firms by the WEF, Korea’s rank was 38th in 2002, fluctuated 
over time and significantly worsened in the two years, resulting in an average rank of 
40.2
nd
 out of 109 countries. The low level of trust in companies together with poor 
labour relations would be reflected in a relatively low level of work ethics. Unlike the 
renowned hallmark diligence of Korean workers, the IMD ranked Korea 32.4
th
 out of 
53 countries on its worker motivation as an annual average over the 2000-2010 period. 
 The level of trust, rigor of ethics and law observance level are remarkably 
lower in Korea than other advanced countries. Korea’s ranking on the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) developed by TI remained more or less steady over the 
period between 2000 and 2010 with an average rank of 42.7
th
 out of 180 countries.  
This indicates a high prevailing perception that the corruption level in Korea is 
relatively quite high, compared to advanced countries. The WEF survey on corruption 
supports the TI results with Korea’s ranking of 37.9th out of 109 countries over the 
period 2000-2010 on favouritism in official decisions. According to the IMD and 
WEF, the perception that social justice is not fairly administered prevails quite highly.  
Over the period 2000-2010, the IMD ranked Korea on its social justice index 43.3
rd
 on 
average out of 53 countries. The WEF ranked Korea on average 44.5
th
 out of 109 
countries on its judicial independence index (Table 2). 
 
 
 
Table 2 Comparative Stances of Korea’s Social Indicators 
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Notes on some of the terms: 
Social responsibility (IMD): the level of social responsibility of business leaders. 
Ethical practice (IMD): ethical practices are implemented by companies. 
CPI (TI): Corruption perceptions index by Transparency International  
Justice (IMD): justice is fairly administered. 
Favouritism in official decision (WEF): favouritism given to well-connected firms 
and individuals when deciding on policies and contracts. 
National culture (IMD): the national culture is open to foreign ideas. 
* In publication year 2003, (except for industrial disputes for which 2001), IMD 
subcategories of data were divided into countries/regions with populations above and 
below 20 million. Korea’s rankings are out of 30 countries studied with populations 
over 20 million. The 2000-10 IMD average excludes values for 2003. 
**For WEF, the annual value for a certain year is an average of that year and the 
immediately following year. For example, the 2010 value is a 2010-2011 average. 
#The total number of countries studied in 2010: IMD: 58, WEF: 139, and TI: 178. 
These numbers have increased over time.  
Sources: IMD (2000-2010); WEF (2000-2011), TI (2000-2010). 
  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Avge 
(2000-
10) 
1) Labour market 
Labour relations 
(IMD) 
44  46  47  30*  60  60  61  55  55  56 56 54.0 
(53)# 
Industrial dispute 
(IMD) 
38  25*  44  45 
 
43  37  38  36 38 n.a. n.a. 39.9 
 
Labour relations 
(WEF) 
56 72 55 93 103 81 114 55 95 131 138*
* 
90.3 
(109)# 
Worker motivation 
(IMD) 
33  32  19  16*  42  37  32  33  30  38 28 32.4 
2) Society’s view of firms 
Social responsibility 
(IMD) 
39 40 24 18* 30 30 34 41 2 15 13 26.8 
Ethical practice (IMD) 38 39 29 26* 38 36 40 41 29 26 28 34.4 
Ethical behaviour 
(WEF) 
n.a. n.a. 38 33 61 35 38 25 27 48 57 40.2 
 
3) Observance of ethics and laws 
CPI (TI) 48 42 40 50 47 40 42 43 40 
 
39 39 42.7 
(180) 
Justice (IMD) 32 32 35 18* 41 35 42 30 31  32 33 34.3 
Favouritism in official 
Decisions (WEF) 
27 35 30 18 49 26 46 15 22 65 84 37.9 
 
Judicial independence 
(WEF) 
44 47 41 49 48 45 51 35 45 58 60 47.5 
 
4) Social attitudes to globalisation 
Attitudes to 
globalisation (IMD) 
n.a. 20 16 3* 14 7 13 32 13 15 13 15.9 
National culture 
(IMD) 
47 48 44 30* 49 53 55 55 55 
 
56 52 51.4 
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 Finally, as compared to other countries, Korean society has relatively opened 
toward globalisation, yet people’s mindsets have remained quite closed to it. 
According to the IMD survey, Korea’s rankings for social attitudes to globalisation 
between 2000 and 2010 fluctuated, ranging 7
th
 to 13
th
, with an average rank of 15.9
th
. 
By contrast, Korea ranked poorly in terms of national culture being closed to foreign 
ideas. Korea was worst ranked in 2000, 2003, 2007 and 2008, with an average rank of 
51.4
th
 out of 53 countries over the 2000-2010 period. This vindicates the arguments 
that nationalism and xenophobia as its corollary are still prevalent in Korea. 
 The above comparative analysis of social indicators reinforces the argument 
that the recent cultural trends within Korea society would be unfavourable for future 
economic development by raising transaction costs. The relative rankings with the 
above social indicators provide comparative assessment of the nation’s business 
environments and are critically important in informing foreign investors and 
businesses when considering opportunities. Therefore, for the nation’s strategic goal 
of achieving the status of advanced countries, Korean mindsets, which are the 
underpinning of formal institutions and economic development, have to adjust 
towards those of advanced countries and the advent of globalisation.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
A wide ranging literature has recently been developed concerning the relationship 
between Confucian culture and East Asian economic development. However, the 
Confucian model has a number of serious theoretical and methodological problems. 
By refining the shortcomings of the Confucian model, this paper has developed a new 
model to explore the relationship between Korea’s Confucian culture and its 
economic development by drawing on the model proposed by Harrison (1985), among 
others. This model introduces an operational intermediary between culture and 
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economic development to make the model more operational and the causality readily 
conceivable. Under this model, culture affects economic development through its 
impacts on transaction costs in the static case and through its impacts on creative 
capacity in the dynamic case. 
 Using this model, this paper has found that a variety of cultural changes in the 
recent past have decreased the level of trust and thus social capital in Korean society, 
thereby increasing transaction costs. Changes in political and economic institutions in 
the wake of the 1997 crisis have promoted individualism and reduced the sense of 
community and the radius of trust. Trust between employers and employees has 
decreased, thereby deteriorating labour relations and raising labour disputes. The 
strong work ethic that characterised Korean workers has weakened, alongside decline 
in workers’ diligence, loyalty and dedication to their employer companies. The 
perception of injustice in society has enhanced because of increasing inequality in 
income and wealth distribution and the widening gap between regular and non-regular 
workers in their working conditions. The rising social injustice has fed into national 
political life, making for a more confrontational politics. Rule of law has lost 
regulatory strength, partly as a consequence of large-scale political scandals, 
corruption in chaebols, and illegal activities of unions. These developments have 
contributed to a declining sense of community and trust, a weaker appreciation of 
cooperation and compromise, and stronger inclination towards confrontation. These 
outcomes all serve to raise transaction costs and socio-economic instability, which 
will adversely affect the Korean economy in the future. 
 Other findings are also consistent with this inauspicious economic trajectory. 
The future orientation that fosters citizens’ creative capacity has faded, as suggested 
by decreasing savings and investment rates. A social view tending to disparage 
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entrepreneurs and business has evolved, discouraging entrepreneurship and creativity. 
Uncertainty perceived by workers after 1997, and uncertainty and instability 
generated by inconsistent government policy measures in the recent past have also 
hindered the future orientation of citizens. Korean society is lacking the sense of 
equality due to the enduring hierarchical collectivism with social stratification. 
 This paper has also analysed a variety of Korean cultural facets relevant to 
economic development, compared to those of other countries by means of social 
indicators developed by a number of well-known international organisations. Trust in 
the Korean labour market has declined markedly more than in other countries. Korean 
society’s trust in private business is relatively low, which, together with low trust in 
labour relations, has weakened worker motivation more than other countries. Again as 
compared to advanced countries, the level of trust, the rigor of ethics, and law 
observance in Korea are all relatively low, as reflected in its higher corruption level. 
Further, Koreans are relatively intransigent to foreign cultures and ideas. All this 
would adversely affect Korea’s international competitiveness and make it difficult for 
Korea to take full advantage of globalisation.  
 In conclusion, the complex and wide-ranging changes in Korean culture in the 
recent past are serving to raise transaction costs and curtail the Korean people’s 
creative capacity. The effects of these cultural changes on the Korean economy are 
likely to be negative in the future. This is further reinforced when relevant facets of 
Korean culture are compared to those of advanced countries. Even if all else remains 
the same, the prospects of the Korean economy will be weakened by the influence of 
culture. To improve Korea’s economic prospects in the emerging globalisation era, 
careful attention needs to be paid to the cultural changes now under way in response 
to recent policy and institutional changes. Government, business and society as a 
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whole will need to work together to redirect what appear to be deleterious cultural 
changes to a direction conducive to economic development.  
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